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Comments

THE PERSONAL LIABILITY OF AGENTS FOR
ADVANCES IN EXCESS OF EARNINGS

The pursuit of reimbursement by a principal who has made advances to an agent in excess of commissions, bonus, or profits earned
has been a frequent source of litigation in recent years.1 The factual situations under which such cases arise are relatively characteristic: 2
A and B enter into a contract whereby A promises to
pay B a commission, bonus, or share of any profits arising
from all sales contracted by B on behalf of A. A likewise
agrees to advance B certain sums of money which are to be
deducted from B's gross commissions, bonus, or profits at
the end of a specified period, usually the term of the contract. B receives advances over a period of time and then
1. See McIntosh v. Noonan, 402 F.2d 431 (1st Cir. 1968); Nicholson v.
Jackson Life Insurance Co., 284 Ala. 604, 226 So. 2d 661 (1969); Agnew v.
Cameron, 247 Cal. App. 2d 619, 55 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1967); Badger v. Nu-Tone
Products Co., 162 Colo. 216, 425 P.2d 698 (1967); Argonaut Builders, Inc. v.
Dare, 145 Colo. 424, 359 P.2d 366 (1961); Valoco Building Products, Inc. v.
Chaffee, 4 Conn. Cir. 322, 231 A.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1966); Biles v. Home Interiors & Gifts, Inc., 112 Ga. App. 21, 143 S.E.2d 566 (1965); Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Teal, 112 Ga. App. 236, 144 S.E.2d 567 (1965) ; Roxy Furniture
& Novelty Co. v. Brand, 106 Ga. App. 104, 126 S.E.2d 295 (1962); Steger v.
Lappin, 119 Il App. 2d 146, 255 N.E.2d 87 (1970); Lease Service, Inc. v.
Haygood, 225 So. 2d 122 (La. App. 1969); Perma-Home Corp. v. Nigro, 346
Mass. 349, 191 N.E.2d 745 (1963); Martin Milling Co. v. Evelyn, 179 Neb. 31,
136 N.W.2d 177 (1965); Joseph Toker, Inc. v. Cohen, 67 N.J. Super. 68, 169
A.2d 838 (1961); Lanard & Axilbund v. Knopman, 55 Del. Co. Rptr. 197
(C.P. Pa. 1967).
2. See cases cited note 1 supra. The cases cited in note one are
similar enough to be representative of the factual situations in which suits
are begun by principals seeking reimbursement for excess advances. However, this is not to say that slight factual variations have not affected the

dies, resigns, or is discharged by A. The advances received
by B exceed the commissions earned, and A demands repayment. B fails to pay. A then sues on the contract for repayment. 3
Such contests may arise from practically any contractual relationship involving the furtherance of sales in goods and services
by one party for another. They have emerged in such diverse
transactions as insurance sales,4 neon sign leasing,5 and sales of
building materials. 6
The courts, in approaching the question of an agent's liability,
have taken diverse paths. Some jurisdictions, such as Pennsylvania
and Alabama, have viewed the relationship of the parties as being
one of creditor and debtor, thus allowing the principal's recovery of
the advances. 7 The overwhelming majority, however, have prevented recovery of the advances by the principal. The majority
courts have established a presumption against personal liability of
the agent or servant in the absence of an express or implied agreelegal rulings on such cases. Both acts and words of the parties subsequent
to the contract can and do change the entire legal perspective to the question. For example, where a party abandons or otherwise breaches the contract, the courts have generally held that the loss shall be sustained by he
who wrongfully breaches, despite a general rule to the contrary in the
absence of such circumstances. See Selig v. Bergman, 43 Wash. 2d 205,
260 P.2d 883 (1953).
3. There is no legal reason why suits are not brought in equity.
However, since the plaintiff is the principal, it is only logical that he would
seek a legal remedy by suing on the contract rather than seek an equitable
remedy. In courts that have eliminated forms of action, the distinction is
less relevant. Equitable principles are considered by the courts. In jurisdictions precluding principal's recovery, decisions are partially based on
the equitable rationale that allowing recovery would cause a forfeiture, or
on the basis of the principal's superior bargaining power. See Agnew v.
Cameron, 247 Cal. App. 2d 619, 55 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1967); Badger v. Nu-Tone
Products Co., 162 Colo. 216, 425 P.2d 698 (1967); Steger v. Lappin, 119
Ill. App. 2d 146, 255 N.E.2d 87 (1970); Joseph Toker, Inc. v. Cohen, 67 N.J.
Super. 68, 169 A.2d 838 (1961).
In states where forms of action are still used, such as Pennsylvania,
cases are often brought in assumpsit and equitable principles apply. It
does not appear that equitable principles have changed the rule. For example, in Lanard& Axilbund v. Knopman, 55 Del. Co. Rptr. 197 (C.P. Pa. 1967),
suit was brought in assumpsit to recover overdraws exceeding $8,000. The
defendant contended that the contractual provisions with respect to his
compensation were intended as liquidated damages and were therefore
unconscionable. The court, without discussing the usual Pennsylvania rationale, which allows recovery from the agent, held for the principal saying
that "the contract [was] clear and not oppressive in any way." Id. at 200.
4. See Steger v. Lappin, 119 111. App. 2d 146, 255 N.E.2d 87 (1970).
5. See Agnew v. Cameron, 247 Cal. App. 2d 619, 55 Cal. Rptr. 733
(1967).
6. See Valoco Building Products Inc. v. Chaffee, 4 Conn. Cir. 322,
231 A.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1966).
7. See Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Longshore, 222 Ala. 408, 132
So. 614 (1931); Beck v. West, 87 Ala. 213, 6 So. 70 (1889); Standard Life Ins.
Co. v. Carey, 282 Pa. 598, 128 A. 537 (1925); Producer's Lumber Co. v.
Guiniven, 260 Pa. 536, 103 A. 916 (1918); Lanard & Axilbund v. Knopman,
55 Del. Co. Rptr. 197 (C.P. Pa. 1967).
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ment to the contrary.8
This Comment will analyze the conflicting approaches to the
question presented and offer a conclusion as to the most reasonable rule to be adopted when dealing with the problem of excess
advances made to an agent by his principal.
I.

THE CONFLICT

When a principal sues his agent for excess advances, the court
must interpret the contract in order to implement the intent of the
parties. 9 The majority of courts considering this problem have
held that unless there are express stipulations or convincing circumstances showing a contrary intent, advances are not the personal liability of the agent. 10 Such courts have raised a presumption against the agent's liability based upon one or more of four
possible rationales: 11
(1) The undertaking is in the nature of a joint venture,
the function of which is the business of the advancer, and
it is to be assumed that the party receiving the advance
does not assume the risk of financial loss. 12
8. Agnew v. Cameron, 247 Cal. App. 2d 619, 55 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1967);
Badger v. Nu-Tone Products Co., 162 Colo. 216, 425 P.2d 698 (1967); Steger
v. Lappin, 119 Ill. App. 2d 146, 255 N.E.2d 87 (1970); Landry v. Huber, 138
So. 2d 449 (La. App. 1962); Karno's v. Sneider, 39 So. 2d 851 (La. App. 1949);
Royal Distributor's Co. v. Friedman, 141 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Harold Furnace Co. v. Junglas, 40 Ohio Op. 75, 88 N.E.2d 586 (C.P. Ohio 1949).
9. See generally Holbrook v. United States, 194 F. Supp. 252 (D.
Oregon 1961); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or AGENCY § 382, comment d (1957).
Upon termination of the relation, the agent is under a duty to account for all he has received on behalf of the principal and to return to the principal anything which is then due to him. If an
agent has received advances from his principal in anticipation of
salary or commissions to which he does not subsequently become
entitled, he is under a duty to repay such to the principal.
Whether or not money given by a principal is given as an advance and is to be repaid by the agent in the event that his commission or other compensation does not amount to the sum advanced, is dependent upon the interpretation of the contract between them.
Id. at 186 (emphasis added). See also Badger v. Nu-Tone Products Co.,
162 Colo. 216, 425 P.2d 698 (1967).
10. See Argonaut Builders, Inc. v. Dare, 145 Colo. 424, 359 P.2d 366
(1961) (circumstances were held to show contrary intent sufficient to allow
jury determination as to liability); Roxy Furniture & Novelty Co. v.
Brand, 106 Ga. App. 104, 126 S.E.2d 295 (1962); Steger v. Lappin, 119 Ill.
App. 2d 146, 255 N.E.2d 87, 89 (1970); Lease Service, Inc. v. Haygood, 225
So. 2d 122 (La. App. 1969); Martin Milling Co. v. Evelyn, 179 Neb. 31, 136
N.W.2d 177 (1965).
11. See Agnew v. Cameron, 247 Cal. App. 2d 619, 55 Cal. Rptr. 733
(1967); Argonaut Builders, Inc. v. Dare, 145 Colo. 424, 359 P.2d 366 (1961);
Steger v. Lappin, 119 111. App. 2d 146, 255 N.E.2d 87 (1970).
12. See Agnew v. Cameron, 247 Cal. App. 2d 619, 55 Cal. Rptr. 733

(2) The furnishing of time, ability, and skill of the
party receiving advances raises the presumption that the
contract and relationship is one of employment. Where advances are made in regular amounts at regular intervals,
and the payment of such is in the nature of a salary not contemplated to be repaid, the presumption
13 arises against liability except from commissions earned.
(3) The party drawing the contract has superior bargaining power, which places upon him a duty to make explicit his rights. Failure to explicitly provide for reimbursement of advances,
therefore, raises a presumption
14
against such liability.
(4) There is a judicial reluctance to cause a forfeiture
of money already received in the absence of convincing circumstances of contractual intent to the contrary, which
places any presumptive burden upon the party seeking repayment. Consequently, in the absence of words or acts to
the contrary, advances are presumed to constitute payment
in lieu of salary and minimum compensation for services
rendered. 15
The minority courts, on the other hand, reject any presumption against liability for monies advanced.' 6 In interpreting the
contractual intent of the parties, these courts scrutinize the words
of agreement and arrive at the conclusion that such advances constitute loans. The reasoning of the minority is that since the advances are to be off-set against future commissions earned, the intent to create a loan is to be presumed. In the absence of an express
or implied provision to the contrary, a party receiving advances is
personally liable for the advances. 7 Though the minority courts
do not expressly accept any presumption as to liability, they do infer
the intent to create a debt, which places upon the agent or servant
the burden of producing evidence to the contrary.' 8 Since the de(1967); Steger v. Lappin, 119 Ill. App. 2d 146, 255 N.E.2d 87 (1970); PermaHome v. Nigro, 346 Mass. 349, 191 N.E.2d 745 (1963); Richmond Dry Goods
v. Wilson, 105 W. Va. 221, 141 S.E. 876 (1928); Shaler Umbrella Co. v.
Blow, 199 Wis. 489, 227 N.W. 1 (1929).
13. Agnew v. Cameron, 247 Cal. App. 2d 619, 55 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1967);
Badger v. Nu-Tone Products Co., 162 Colo. 216, 425 P.2d 698 (1967); Steger
v. Lappin, 119 Ill. App. 2d 146, 255 N.E.2d 87(1970); Roofing Sales Co. v.
Rose, 103 N.J.L. 553, 137 A. 211 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
14. See cases cited note 13 supra.
15. Agnew v. Cameron, 247 Cal. App. 2d 619, 55 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1967);
Joseph Toker, Inc. v. Cohen, 67 N.J. Super. 68, 169 A.2d 838, 841 (1961);
Roofing Sales Co. v. Rose, 103 N.J.L. 553, 137 A. 211 (Sup. Ct. 1927). It is
important to note that the third and fourth rationales presented (cases
cited in this note) do not fall squarely within the category of "legal relationships." They are more policy oriented, though such policy must be
supported in reason by the relationships suggested. The effect and rationale of these policies will be tested and differentiated with respect to the
other majority bases of justification.
16. See cases cited note 7 supra.
17. See cases cited note 7 supra. See also Snellenburg Clothing Co.
v. Levitt, 282 Pa. 65, 127 A. 309 (1925).
18. See cases cited note 7 supra; e.g., Beck v. West, 87 Ala. 213, 6 So.
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fendant-agent must sustain the burden of coming forth with contrary evidence, the practical effect of the minority rule is a presumption of liability.
Under the majority rule, the first step in reaching the conclusion against liability is an examination of the relationship of the
parties. After the joint venture or employment relationship is discovered, a presumption arises against liability on the basis of that
relationship or equitable principles related thereto. Thus, the nexus
between contractual interpretation and the resultant presumption
of non-liability is the relationship of the parties.
In the formulation of the minority rule, no such nexus exists.
The minority courts, in the absence of an express or implied provision to the contrary, infer a loan unless the agent or servant can
prove otherwise. From the inference of a loan, the minority rule
necessarily infers a creditor-debtor relationship. Therefore, the
relationship of the parties for the minority courts is a result,
whereas for the majority jurisdiction it is the means of achieving
the result. Herein lies the conflict to be discussed.
II. THE

MAJORITY

A. The joint venture rationale
For many of the majority courts, the joint venture serves as
the basis for the presumption against the personal liability of an
agent. A joint adventure, or joint venture, is a legal relationship of
relatively recent development in the American courts. It is distinguishable from a partnership in that it is usually instituted for
a single transaction of a particular kind, rather than for general
business transactions of unspecified duration. 19 A joint venture,
70 (1889), where defendant had acted as a traveling salesman for the
plaintiffs who furnished him samples and, to enable him to meet expenses
until profits were realized, advanced him $50 every two weeks. Defendant
was to be compensated by half the profits of sales, from which the advances were to be deducted. The anticipated profits never accrued, and the
plaintiffs sued to recover the advances. The court interpreted the contract
to provide that the plaintiffs were to "lend to [Beck], or advance for him
$50 for every two weeks he was actually engaged in such service . . . and,
if such share of the profits fell short of reimbursing them, then Beck would
owe them the balance." Id. at 214, 6 So. at 71.
19. Fishback v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 621 (D. S.D. 1963); J.L.
Johnson, Inc. v. Carmer, 38 Del. Ch. 579, 156 A.2d 499 (1959); Horn's Crane
Serv. v. Prior, 182 Neb. 94, 152 N.W.2d 421 (1967); Walls v. Gribble, 168 Ore.
542, 124 P.2d 713 (1942); Fredrickson v. Kluever, 152 N.W.2d 346 (Sup. Ct.
S.D. 1967); 48 C.J.S. Joint Adventures § 1 (1947).

though not strictly a partnership, is judged and governed by the
20
rules applicable to partnerships.
There are four elements to the joint venture:
(1) A contribution of money, property, time, or skill
by each of the parties,
(2) joint proprietorship and mutuality of control of the
subject matter of the venture,
(3) a mutual right to share profits and a duty to share
losses, and
(4) an agreement, either express or implied, establishing a joint venture relationship. 21
The contributions of each party do not have to be in kind, and
co-ownership of property is not essential; a joint venture may exist
where one party contributes money and the other skill and services
in the operation of the venture. 22 The element of control required
of each party to constitute a joint venture differs according to jurisdiction and factual circumstance, though it is r6cognized in all jurisdictions that at least a right of control over the conduct of the ven23
ture is requisite.
An agreement to share in the profits and losses of the venture
is generally recognized as a necessary element,2 4 although there is
some authority to the contrary. 25 Whether an express or implied agreement for mutual sustaining of losses is necessary or not,
20. Wood v. Western Beef Factory, Inc., 378 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1967);
Larson v. Robinson, 136 F. Supp. 469 (D. Mont. 1956); Preston v. State
Indus. Acc. Comm'n., 174 Ore. 553, 149 P.2d 957 (1944); Few v. Few, 239
S.C. 321, 122 S.E.2d 829 (1962).
21. See Pinkowski v. Coglay, 347 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1965); Richardson v. Walsh Constr. Co., 334 F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1964); Bach v. Liberty
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 36 Wis. 2d 72, 152 N.W.2d 911 (1967). See also cases
cited note 19 supra.
22. See Wood v. Western Beef Factory, Inc., 378 F.2d 96 (10th Cir.
1967); Eagle Star Co. v. Bean, 134 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1943); Frazell v.
United States, 213 F. Supp. 457 (D. La. 1963).
23. In tort cases where liability of a defendant depends upon establishing a joint venture between an agent and his principal, the courts are
reluctant to rule that a joint venture exists unless ".

.

. some active par-

ticipation in the enterprise; some control of the subject-matter thereof or
property engaged in" is shown. Soulek v. City of Omaha, 140 Neb. at 154,
299 N.W. at 371 (1941). See also C.C. Roddy Inc. v. Carlisle, 391 S.W.2d 765
(Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
However, in cases involving business oriented joint ventures where
suit is brought for an accounting or other pecuniary interest, the courts
have ruled that a right of control is essential to the joint venture, but
that the active right of control may be delegated. See Eagle Star Co. v.
Bean, 134 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1943); Frazell v. United States, 213 F. Supp.
457 (D. La. 1963).
At any rate, all jurisdictions recognize that at least a right of control
is requisite, and this right is to a voice in the venture's management.
See Brenner v. Plitt, 182 Md. 348, 34 A.2d 853 (1943); People v. Curiale,
171 Misc. 264, 12 N.Y.S.2d 464 (Dist. Ct. 1939).
24. See cases cited note 21 supra.
25. Shell Oil Co. v. Prestidge, 249 F.2d 413, 416 (9th Cir. 1957).
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however, it is uniformly accepted that joint venturers are accountable to each other for any use of the venture property. 26 But perhaps the most important element of the joint venture is the intent
27
As
of the parties, express or implied, to form such a relationship.
a result, the courts 28carefully scrutinize the circumstances surrounding the agreement.
The factor differentiating partnerships from joint ventures is
that the latter are generally limited to particular business transactions while a partnership usually conducts general business. 29 Thus,
because the contracts disputed in cases where principals attempt
to recover advances involve particular business transactions, a joint
venture could exist. For example, in Steger v. Lappin8 ° a principal entered into an agreement with an employee who promised to
serve as the agent of the principal in the sale of insurance. The
agent was a man of great experience in the field and, knowing his
own worth, informed his principal that he required $900 per month.
The sum was later increased to $1000 per month. The principal
agreed to both demands, forwarding the money by way of advances
to be deducted from future commissions. The untimely death of
the agent, however, precluded the accrual of the anticipated sales
and the principal sued his former agent's estate for the excess.
The Illinois court, in taking the majority position, held:
The rationale of the existence of the majority rule is that
the employee's undertaking is in the nature of a joint enterprise with the employer, the main object of which is the
26. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 21(1) (1969):
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and
hold as trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other partners from any transaction connected with
the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from
any use by him of its property.
Id. at 258. The rules of partnerships apply to joint ventures. (See cases
cited note 20 supra). And the Uniform Partnership Act has been adopted
by forty-four states, including those using the joint venture rationale for a
presumption against liability.
Moreover, the majority rule that a joint venturer is liable for losses
has been codified in the act: "Each partner shall be repaid his contributions . . . ; and must contribute towards the losses .. " UNIFORM PARTNERsHIP ACT § 18(2) (1969).
27. See generally Brenner v. Plitt, 182 Md. 348, 34 A.2d 853 (1943):
To constitute a 'joint venture' or 'joint adventure,' as it is sometimes called, it is not sufficient that parties share in profits and
losses, but they must intend to be associated as partners. ...
Id. at 352, 34 A.2d at 857.
28. See generally Alden v. Stromsem, 347 Ill. App. 439, 106 N.E.2d 837
(1952); Meyer v. Sharp, 341 Ill. App. 431, 94 N.E.2d 510 (1950).
29. Cases cited note 19 supra.
30. 119 Ill. App. 2d 146, 255 N.E.2d 87 (1970).

employer's business, and it is not to be assumed that the
employee, in furnishing his time and ability, is to assume
all risk.8 '
In Steger, the principal contributed money and the decedent his
skill and expertise; these contributions meet the requirements
needed for a joint venture. However, the holding of the court becomes questionable when compared to the elements of control, sharing of profits and losses, and intent prerequisite to the existence of
a joint venture.
An agent cannot be said to manage or control an insurance
business because he had agreed to contract sales of insurance. The
contract between the principal and the agent in Steger recognized
no right of control in the agent, nor did it empower him beyond
the right to contract insurance sales on behalf of the principal.
Likewise, it can hardly be contended that the principal (who was
an employee of the insurance company himself) meant or was even
empowered, to create a type of relationship with the decedent akin
to a partnership with the insurance company.
The question of an agreement to share profits and losses presents an even more complex inconsistency. Assuming that the
states using the joint venture rationale also require an agreement
to share losses as prerequisite to the formation of a joint venture, a
showing that no agreement to share losses existed precludes the
existence of that relationship. The presumption against an agent's
liability, if based upon the existence of a joint venture, would be invalid. The parties in the Steger case, for example, had no agreement to share losses as required by Illinois law;

2

therefore, there

could be no joint venture.
If the states relying upon a joint venture rationale do not require an agreement to share losses as a prerequisite, the rule against
liability would be invalid. The Uniform Partnership Act governs
the law of joint ventures and has been adopted by the states using
the joint venture rationale. 3 Thus, while case law may allow the
formation of a joint venture absent an agreement to share losses,
31. 119 Ill. App. 2d at 148, 255 N.E.2d at 89. Citing Agnew v. Cameron, 247 Cal. App. 2d 619, 55 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1967).
32. The Uniform Partnership Act, which requires partners to share

losses of venture property, is law in Illinois.

See UNIFORM-I

PARTNERSHiP

6 U.L.A. 1 (Master Ed. 1969).
33. E.g., Steger v. Lappin, 119 Ill. App. 2d 146, 255 N.E.2d 87 (1970)
(Illinois adopted the Uniform Partnership Act in 1917). Likewise, the
other cases cited for the joint venture rationale are governed by the Act.
See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT 6 U.L.A. 1 (Master Ed. 1969).
Therefore, since partners must account to each other and share losses,
the fact that the court does not require an agreement to share losses in the
formation of the venture is immaterial. See note 25 supra; UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(a) (1969):
Each partner shall be repaid his contributions whether by way of
capital or advances . . . and must contribute toward losses. ...
Id. at 213.
ACT

Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

once a joint venture is established the statutory provisions of the
Uniform Partnership Act require joint venturers to account to each
other for losses sustained. Since suits for recovery of excess advances arise only on occasions where a loss is suffered, it is inconsistent to rule that one of the joint venturers is not jointly responsible for the loss of venture funds forwarded in anticipaton of a profit.
Recognizing the questionability of the joint venture rationale
in Steger v. Lappin, the problems of the majority argument are
multiplied by the many cases from various jurisdictions that have
used this formula as a basis for the rule in similar factual situations. 34 The source of confusion in arriving at a joint venture rationale can be discovered by probing its development. An early
New York case, Schlesinger v. Burland,35 is the case most cited by
courts for the construction that the relationship of the parties is
one of joint venture. 6 In that case, the plaintiff was employed by
defendant co-partners as a traveling salesman for the period of a
year. The plaintiff was to be paid ten per cent of the gross profits
of sale and the defendants were to "advance" him $250 monthly, plus
necessary traveling expenses, to be charged to and deducted from
the plaintiff's commissions at the end of the term. Five months
after the contract term began, the defendants stopped paying the
advances and the plaintiff sued to recover them. The defendants
counterclaimed for a sum advanced in excess of the commissions
earned by the plaintiff. A demurrer was sustained on the counterclaim and the defendants assigned error.
The New York court held that the advances were not intended
as a loan to the plaintiff except to the extent of the commissions
earned. In an attempt to establish the absence of the plaintiff's
liability and to discount the defendant's contentions that the advances were loans, the court discussed all the possible relationships
34. See generally cases cited note 12 supra. It is important to note
that the courts using the joint venture rationale have not even actually
termed the relationship as a joint venture. Rather, they have said that the
relationships were "in the nature of joint ventures."
However, even if
used solely as a legal hook upon which to hang a policy decision, the joint
venture rationale is a rather poor tool for such purpose.
35. 42 Misc. 206, 85 N.Y.S. 350 (Sup. Ct. 1903).
36. The following cases have cited Schlesinger: Shore v. Crail, 123
P.2d 840 (Cal. Cir. Ct. App. 1942); Srere v. Rapp. 233 Ill. App. 190 (Dist. Ct.
1924); Hall v. Bird-Bergstrom Motor Car Co., 227 Ill. App. 587 (Dist. Ct.
1923); Felsenthal Bros. & Co. v. Gradwohl, 217 Ill. App. 170 (Dist. Ct. 1920);
Bardwell v. Szatmary, 99 So. 2d 420 (Ct. App. La. 1957); American Furniture Co. v. Snell, 164 So. 478 (La. App. 1935) (case is a major precedent
in the state of La.); Selig v. Bergman, 43 Wash. 2d 205, 260 P.2d 883 (1953).
In Richmond Dry Goods Co. v. Wilson, 105 W. Va. 221, 141 S.E. 876

that could have existed. But the court never stated whether the
relationship was one of joint venture or one of employment, nor
analyzed the requisite elements of the joint venture in relation to
the facts of the case:
We speak of an advance of wages and an advance of salary,
yet no one would regard this as a loan of so much money to
the employee, which he has promised or is expected to repay. Again, for the purposes of a joint adventure, one
agrees to give his services, and the other to advance the
capital required. No one would consider the former bound
to repay the capital advanced out of his own means. Hence
without a promise to repay, express, or fairly to be implied
from the agreement under which the advances were made,
a promise to advance money for a particular purpose-as
here, the furtherance of defendant's business--does not import an expectation of3 its
return by the person to whom the
7
money was advanced.
No court has ever clearly analyzed the elements of a joint venture
to discover the rationality of the rule. But many courts have cited
Schlesinger v. Burland for a holding that relationships between
principal and agent, in similar factual situations, are in the nature
of a joint venture, even though that case never clearly determined
whether the parties were joint venturers or employer and employee.
As a result, cases citing Schlesinger v. Burland have been cited in
still later cases. This misinterpretation has further compounded
the confusion over the reasoning behind the rule.38
The validity of this contention is shown by the fact that subsequent New York cases have held that relationships of similar factual circumstance are not joint ventures. In Zuby v. Height,89 the
plaintiff entered into a contract whereby he was to share in onethird of the profits accruing from his management of the defendant's dress factory. He was given a helper (who joined in the suit
against defendant) to assist him. Both plaintiffs were to have a
drawing account of $50 which was to be deducted from their share of
the profits. The plaintiffs were not paid the drawing account and
(1928), a case also citing Schlesinger,the court held:
We regard [the contract] rather as signifying a joint enterprise in
which the employee furnished his time and ability and employer
furnished the money necessary to enable the employee to devote
himself thereto ....
The advances are therefore not regarded as
loans to the employee but as speculations in a common enterprise.
Id. at 221, 141 S.E. at 877. This case, in turn, has frequently been cited in
more recent cases which again multiples the many errors in the interpretations of Schlesinger given by various courts.
37. Schlesinger v. Burland, 42 Misc. 206, 207, 85 N.Y. 350, 351 (Sup. Ct.
1903).
38. See, e.g., Steger v. Lappin, 119 Ill. App. 2d 146, 255 N.E.2d 87 (1970),
which cited as authority for the joint venture rationale Agnew v. Cameron, 247 Cal. App. 2d 619, 55 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1967) and Srere v. Rapp, 233
Ill. App. 190 (Dist. Ct. 1924), which in turn was based on Schlesinger v.
Burland, 42 Misc. 206, 85 N.Y. 350 (Sup. Ct. 1903).
39. Zuby v. Height, 188 N.Y.S. 88 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
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sued. Their cause was dismissed on defendant's contention that the
contract was one of joint venture.
In reversing the decision, the New York court held that the
agreement was manifestly one of employment for a fixed
term, with fixed duties, and without a single element involved in partnership, except a share in
40 the net profits....
There was, therefore, no joint venture.
Thus, there appears to be a marked discrepancy between the
criterion for joint ventures in New York and the rule adopted from
Schlesinger in other jurisdictions. 41 Of course, courts are not
strictly bound to justify each decision according to a prescribed
legalistic pattern. The joint venture rationale may represent a policy decision in favor of the agent, in which case this critique of its
soundness becomes somewhat moot. However, the joint venture
does not even provide a sound legalistic basis for an analogy upon
which to construct a valid policy judgment. For the reasons stated
above, the consequences of basing the presumption against liability
upon the joint venture rationale should be considered carefully before holding that such contracts between a principal and an agent
form a relationship in the nature of a joint venture.
B.

The employment rationale

Courts following the majority rule, which raises a presumption
against the agent's personal liability for advances in excess of earnings, frequently use both the joint venture and employment con40. Id. at 89. The fact that the plaintiffs here were the agents, and
not the principal, should not have any effect upon the existence or nonexistence of the joint venture. The formation of a joint venture precedes
suit and, if it exists at all, the joint venture exists a priori and independent
of suit.
41. Cf. Harry R. Gordon, Inc. v. Garcia Sugars Corp., 241 App. Div.
155, 271 N.Y.S. 303 (Sup. Ct. 1934). In this case, the plaintiff was a manufacturer's agent and broker for the sale of sugar, flour, coffee, and cereal.
The defendant appointed the plaintiff as his exclusive broker at the rate of
45% of the net profits earned by the plaintiff whether resulting from the
sale of defendant's products or generally from the business of the plaintiff.
Both parties were accorded the right to examine each other's books.
Despite the elements of control of each of the parties, however, the
appellate court overruled a judgment for the plaintiff for commissions on
the basis that the contract was not one of joint venture.
The arrangement between the parties has none of the characteristics
of a joint venture. It is only the usual brokerage agreement on a
commission basis, with the additional element that the principal receives an interest in the net profits of the broker's business. There
is no joint proprietary interest here in any partnership assets.
There is no agreement to share losses as well as profits from
which a fiduciary relationship could be implied. There is only
the obligation by the defendant to pay commissions and by the

tract rationales. For example, in Steger v. Lappin,42 the court first
explained that there could be no liability of an employee for advances in a contract of employment and, secondly, that the rule applied because the relationship of the parties was in the nature of a
joint venture. The question of an agent's liability, however, should
not be approached on the basis of both the joint venture and masterservant relationships. The joint venture and employment relationbeships are mutually exclusive for the purpose herein discussed,
43
cause their respective characteristics are contradictory.
In contrast to the elements of the joint venture, the relationship of master and servant is indicated by an agreement, express or
implied, by one to perform services for another, under the latter's
control, for a considerable period of time. The party performing the
service is given a salary. The work must be part of the regular
business of the employer. And, the parties must intend to create
44
a master-servant relationship.
The right of control over the physical activities of the servant
is generally recognized as the single most important element of the
master-servant relationship. 4 The element of control is directly
wherein both paropposite to that of the joint venture relationship
46
ties must possess at least a right of control.
The word salary is generally defined as a periodic allowance or
recompense paid to a person at regular intervals for official or professional services or for regular work. 47 An important characterisplaintiff to pay a share of its net profits to the defendant. This
is insufficient to create a joint adventure.
Id. at 157, 271 N.Y.S. at 305. See also Byrne v. Blaker Advertising Agency,
Inc., 239 App. Div. 395, 267 N.Y.S. 662 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
42. 119 Ill. App. 2d 146, 147, 255 N.E.2d 87, 89 (1970).
43. See generally People v. Curiale, 171 Misc. 264, 12 N.Y.S.2d 464
(Dist. Ct. 1939).
44. See generally Westover v. Stockholders Pub. Co., 237 F.2d 948 (9th
Cir. 1956); In re Read's Petition, 224 F. Supp. 241 (S.D. Fla. 1963); Holland
v. Celebrezze, 223 F. Supp. 347 (D. Tenn. 1963); W.A. SEAvY, LAW OF AGENCY
§ 84(d) (1964). See also § 84(f), which exposes the possibility of still another relationship-the independent contractor. Where independent contractor status exists, advances made by an employer are debts for which the
recipient is personally liable. See Argonaut Builders, Inc. v. Dare, 145 Colo.
424, 359 P.2d 366 (1961), where the court, after finding that the defendant
operated on an independent basis free of control by the plaintiff, stated that
the general rule precluding recovery by an employer, in the absence of an
express or implied agreement to the contrary, did not apply. The advances were considered as debts and the question of the contractor's liability to be for a jury.
45. Hoosier Home Imp. Co. v. United States, 350 F.2d 640 (11th Cir.
1965); N.L.R.B. v. A.S. Abell Co., 327 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1964); Continental Bus
Sys., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 325 F.2d 267 (10th Cir. 1963); Edwards v. United
States, 168 F. Supp. 955 (C.C. 1958); W.A. SEAvY, LAW OF AGENCY § 84(c)
(1964).
46. Eagle Star Co. v. Bean, 134 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1943); cf. Frazell v.
United States, 213 F. Supp. 457 (D. La. 1963).
47. Hestand v. Erke, 227 Ark. 309, 298 S.W.2d 44 (1957); Board of
Comm'rs of Teller County v. Trowbridge, 42 Colo. 449, 95 P. 554 (1908);
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tic of the salary is that its payment is not based upon the services
rendered but upon the time agreed for its payment. 48 In the absence of an express agreement, the relationship of master-servant
does not collapse, for the courts imply a promise to pay unless a
close family relation or other circumstances indicate a contrary intent.

49

While no court presented with the question of an agent's liability has precisely analyzed the factual circumstances of the parties
in comparison to the prerequisite elements of the master-servant
relationship, it appears that the employment contract rationale is
reasonable. In Badger v. Nu-Tone Products Co.,50 for example,
the Supreme Court of Colorado adopted an employment rationale
in precluding a master's recovery of advances in excess of his servant's earned commissions.
In the Badger case, the defendant, Badger, entered into two
agreements to sell the products of Nu-Tone throughout the western
half of the state of Kansas. Badger was to be paid a commission,
in advances, of $100 a week on a regular basis at the discretion of
Nu-Tone. The sum was subsequently raised by $500 per month
when Badger threatened to resign because of severe financial
difficulty. The amounts advanced continually exceeded Badger's
commissions until it reached $4,214.35 at the time he resigned.
When Badger failed to repay the advances upon demand, Nu-Tone
brought suit to recover them and was awarded judgment. Badger
appealed.
State ex rel. Hirst v. Black, 7 Terry 295, 83 A.2d 678 (1951); Maes v. City of
New Orleans, 97 So. 2d 856, 858 (La. App. 1957); Home Beneficial Life
Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 181 Va. 811, 817, 27
S.E.2d 159, 164 (1943).
48. See generally United States v. Grant, 237 F.2d 511, 514 (7th Cir.
1956); State ex rel. Hirst v. Black, 7 Terry 295, 83 A.2d 678 (1951); Commonwealth Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Board of Review of Dept. of Labor,
414 Ill. 475, 111 N.E.2d 345 (1953).
49. See generally Gimbel v. Laird & Co., 119 N.J.L. 170, 194 A. 61
(Ct. App. 1937); Hartly v. Bohrer, 52 Idaho 72, 11 P.2d 616 (1932); McCollure v. Clothier, 121 Utah 311, 241 P.2d 468 (1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
AcENCY § 441 (1957):
Unless the relation of the parties, the triviality of the services, or
other circumstances, indicate that the parties have agreed otherwise, it is inferred that a person promises to pay for services
which he requests or permits another to perform for him as his
agent.
Id. at 336. See also RESTATEMENT RESTITUTION § 108(2) (1957). Where the
payment of advances is not on a regular basis, it appears that the courts do
not imply a term for salary, but allow the question of the agent's liability
to go to the jury. See generally Argonaut Builders, Inc. v. Dare, 145 Colo.
424, 359 P.2d 366 (1961).
50. 162 Colo. 216, 425 P.2d 698 (1967).

The elements of the master-servant relationship are present in
Badger. There was an express agreement by Badger to perform
services for Nu-Tone, though the contingency of advances in excess
of commissions was not contemplated at the time of agreement. The
work to be performed was in the regular business of Nu-Tone. The
remaining elements necessary to constitute a master-servant relationship are the existence of a salary and the requisite intent.
As stated previously, the term of a contract providing for a
salary may be implied where reasonable. 51 The Colorado court implied the requisite salary provision:
...

[T]he payments are made in regular amounts in con-

sideration of the continued activity by2 the employee and are
thus in the nature of salary or wages.
The intent to enter such a relationship was derived from the
circumstances surrounding the contract. 3 Badger had performed
services in the regular course of Nu-Tone's business for a salary.
Thus, the court in "construing its terms, looking at the factual background, [and] the interpretation put upon the agreement by the
parties" 54 ruled that the obligation to repay, at most, created an
obligation against future commissions imposing no personal liability
on the part of Badger. 55
In comparison to the joint venture rationale, no contradictions
as to the law and its application appear in basing a presumption
against liability on the part of the servant upon the employment rationale. An earlier case using the employment rationale, Roofing
Sales Co. v. Rose,5 6 reveals the constancy of the rule's development.
Roofing Sales Company had employed Rose for the sale of the
former's goods. Rose was to receive $30 per week advance against
commissions, which was later increased to $40 per week. When,
without Rose's assent, the company reduced his advances to $30
per week, Rose resigned. Roofing Sales Company sued Rose for
$328.71 in advances exceeding commissions earned.
The defendant had agreed to perform a service for the plaintiff
in the regular course of the latter's business. As in Badger, the
New Jersey court held that the defendant was not personally liable.
51. See cases cited note 47 supra and accompanying text.
52. Badger v. Nu-Tone Products Co., 162 Colo. 216, 218, 425 P.2d 698,
700 (1967) (citing 56 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 120 (1948) ).
53. Badger v. Nu-Tone Products Co., 162 Colo. 216, 425 P.2d 698 (1967).
The court stated:
In effect, the law is that where there is an ambiguity in an employment contract, in addition to the specific language used in the
contract, the nature of the relationship, the conduct of the parties,
the principles and rules applicable thereto are all implied a part
of that contract and must be considered in arriving at the intention of the parties thereto.
Id. at 218, 425 P.2d at 700.
54. Id. at 221, 425 P.2d at 703.
55. Id.
56. 103 N.J.L. 553, 137 A. 211 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
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The contract was construed to show the intent of the parties to form
an employment relationship, with an implied term of a salary equal
to the value of the advances. After examining the minority rule,
which holds the servant personally liable, the court refused to adopt
it, stating:
We cannot adopt [the minority] reasoning in the present
case, since it seems to us that it overlooks the vital fact
that the advancements made were in lieu of salary for
work actually to be performed and that the amounts advanced were contemplated by the parties to fix the minimum paid, and if there was no excess of the amounts advanced, earned by way of commissions, or if the commissions equaled or exceeded the amount advanced, then, in
such case, the57 commissions should be offset against the advances made.
The methodology of the majority courts is illustrated by the
cases which have used the master-servant rationale. The court
must interpret an ambiguous contract-the contract has no provision for the contingency of advances exceeding commissions earned.
The courts look to the relationship of the parties and, seeing that
they performed as master and servant, imply the missing. salary
provision. The implied term fills the gap left in the contract by the
parties and gives reasonable effect to all the contract terms. Furthermore, the intent of the parties is not presumed. It is interpreted by viewing the contract and the acts of the parties. What is
presumed is the non-liability of the servant, which in the light of
all the circumstances appears to be a reasonable inference.
C. The policy rationales
Of the four rationales supporting the majority presumption
against the liability of agents for excess advances, the two already
discussed-those of joint venture and master-servant-are rules
at least purportedly based upon objective criteria as to the relationship of the parties. The remaining two, however, are primarily
policy oriented.
These policy rationales are, respectively, a recognition of a
well settled judicial reluctance to cause a forfeiture of money already received, unless it convincingly appears that such a result
57. Id. at 556, 137 A. at 214. See also Agnew v. Cameron, 247 Cal.
App. 2d 619, 55 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1967); Steger v. Lappin, 119 Ill. App. 2d 146,
255 N.E.2d 87 (1970); Pasenelli v. Lombardi, 349 Mass. 250, 207 N.E.2d 683
(1965); Borg-Warner Corp. v. Ingersoll Kalamazoo Div., 18 Wis. 2d 484,
118 N.W.2d 900 (1963).

was intended by the parties1 8 and a consideration of the superior
bargaining power of the drawer of the contract against which any
presumptive rule should apply. 9 The above rationales originate
from general principles of contract law and, as such, form a separate basis of justification for the majority rule as well as support
for the master-servant and joint venture rationales.
The question of an agent's personal liability for excess advances arises where there is no express or implied provisions for
such a contingency."
The majority of cases, using the superior
bargaining power rationale, place the onus of any contractual
ambiguity upon the plaintiff-principal. 61 Where an ambiguity as
to contractual provisions arises, it is generally recognized that the
contract should be construed against the drawer and in favor of the
other party.6 2 However, although the superior bargaining power of
the principal may be an important consideration in presuming
the non-liability of an agent, the argument is not always sustained
by the preponderance of the evidence. In Steger v. Lappin,63 the
facts disclose that the principal was anxious to acquire the services
of a well experienced and highly skilled salesman. The principal
not only met the agent's firm initial demands, but later increased
the agent's advances by $100 upon demand. The Illinois court, in
Steger, held that "[c] onsideration is also given to the assumption
that an employer has superior bargaining power ...."64 Steger
exemplifies the situation in which the superior bargaining power
clearly was in the defendant; yet, a decision in the agent's favor was
at least partially based upon the theory of a superior bargaining
power in the principal not supported by the facts.
58. Agnew v. Cameron, 247 Cal. App. 2d 619, 55 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1967);
Steger v. Lappin, 119 Ill. App. 2d 146, 255 N.E.2d 87 (1970). It is important to note at this juncture that the rules discussed in this Comment
may vary substantially in cases where the money has not been received,
or where the agent or servant is suing for advances or commissions not
yet paid over to him. In such cases, the position of the agent or servant is
not as good since he must bear the burden of proving the disputed contractual provision. See generally Theriault v. E.L. King & Co., 282 Mass.
109, 184 N.E. 386 (1933); Staples & Staples v. Harvey, 133 Va. 305, 112 S.E.
607 (1922).
59. Agnew v. Cameron, 247 Cal. App. 2d 619, 55 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1967);
Steger v. Lappin, 119 Ill. App. 2d 146, 255 N.E.2d 87 (1970); Badger v. NuTone Products Co., 162 Colo. 216, 425 P.2d 366 (1967).
60. See generally cases cited note 1 supra.
61. See generally cases cited note 13 supra.
62. Id. See also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 236, comment d (1932):

Since one who speaks or writes, can by the exactness of expres-

sion, more easily prevent mistakes in meaning, doubts arising from
ambiguity of language are resolved against the former in favor of
the latter.
Id. at 130. Note that this rule is applied even in jurisdictions following
the minority rule, such as Pennsylvania. See Shallcross v. Highway Trailer
Co., 147 Pa. Super. 279, 24 A.2d 71 (1938).
63. 119 Ill. App. 2d 146, 255 N.E.2d 87 (1970).
64. Id. at 148, 25 N.E.2d at 89.
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In Badger v. Nu-Tone Products Co., 65 the agent, Badger, had
forced an increase of $500 per month as an alternative to his resignation. The Colorado court considered it important to construe
the contract "most strongly against the party [Nu-Tone] preparing it or employing the words concerning which the doubt arises."'6
Although it appears that a construction of the contract involved
in such cases must consider the bargaining power of the parties in
order to formulate valid policy decisions, it does not appear that
such factual interpretation has been uniformly applied to both parties. Were the courts to study the facts closely, the policy requiring ambiguous contracts to be interpreted against the party preparing it would be quite fair. But even in cases where the facts tend
to show no such superior bargaining power, the courts have construed the contract against the drawer. The tendency to apply the
superior bargaining power rationale in these cases lessens the
efficacy of the rule.
The alternative policy rationale-that a forfeiture of monies
paid is to be avoided-is also grounded upon generally accepted
legal principles.6 7 It would be a harsh rule to require the return of
funds contemplated by the parties (at least where the master-servant rationale is in force) as salary to an employee where no express
or implied agreement to return has been shown.
The possibility does exist, however, that preventing reimbursement to the principal, under the policy rationale, leads to a forfeiture on the employer's part. For example, in Marcus v. National
Life Ins. Co., 6s an employee sued to recover commissions earned.
The court held that the agent could not recover on the theory of unjust enrichment where the cost to the defendant company for training the employee outweighed the value of the commissions. Although a suit where the agent was seeking unpaid commissions,
which changes the agent's legal position,69 the case shows that there
may be equities on both sides of the forfeiture question. Thus, an
argument can be made that the majority rule actually causes a forfeiture by the plaintiff-principal in cases where training or other
incidents of the contract accrue to the agent's benefit.
A forfeiture by the principal has not arisen in the cases in point,
and does not represent a flaw in the forfeiture rationale. It is
65.
66.

162 Colo. 216, 425 P.2d 698 (1967).
Id. at 217, 425 P.2d at 699.

67. See generally cases cited note 15 supra and accompanying text.
68. 422 F.2d 626 (7th Cir. 1970).
69. See text accompanying note 58 supra.

suggested, however, that both of the policy rationales should be construed sui generis in arriving at the most equitable solution to each
particular case. Because they are just and reasonable, the policy
rationales are sound bases upon which to raise a presumption
against an agent's liability for advances in excess of commissions
earned. However, the need for careful scrutinization of their applicability in particular situations should be emphasized in order to
achieve a just uniformity in their application.

III.

THE MINORITY

Whereas the majority of courts that have considered the question of an agent's duty to repay excess advances have raised the
presumption against such personal liability, a small minoritynamely Alabama and Pennsylvania-have steadfastly clung to the
contrary position, which imposes liability upon such servants or
agents. 70 In contrast to the majority rationales, these jurisdictions
view the contract between the parties as constituting a loan, which
necessarily implies a construction of their relationship as that of
71
debtor-creditor.
The reasoning behind the minority position is essentially that,
since there is no express or implied agreement providing for the
contingency that occurs when commissions do not equal advances, implying the existence of a loan is the only reasonable alternative to reconstructing the contract.7 2 The Pennsylvania case of
Snellenberg Clothing Co. v. Levitt 73 provides an example of the

minority approach. Snellenberg Clothing Co. engaged the defendant as a traveling salesman. Defendant was to receive a commission on sales and an annual drawing account of $15,000 to be applied against commissions earned. After several years, the employment 74 was terminated by mutual consent. The plaintiff
sued for advances $16,751.09 in excess of commissions earned by defendant.
In rejecting the defendant's argument that such advances were
paid as salary, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated:
The parties apparently did not anticipate earnings falling
below the amount of the advances, and consequently made
no express provision for the contingency. This, however,
is no reason for reading into the contract something it does
70. See Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Longshore, 222 Ala. 408, 132 So.
614 (1931); Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Carey, 282 Pa. 598, 128 A. 537 (1925);
Snellenburg Clothing Co. v. Levitt, 282 Pa. 65, 127 A. 309 (1925); Producer's
Lumber Co. v. Geiniven, 260 Pa. 536, 103 A. 916 (1918); Lanard & Axilbund v. Knopman, 55 Del. Co. 197 (C.P. Pa. 1967).
71. See cases cited note 70 supra.
72. See cases cited note 70 supra.
73. 282 Pa. 65, 127 A. 309 (1925).
74. Id. at 67, 127 A. at 310. The court termed the over-all relationship of the parties one of "employment".
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not contain and thus make a new contract for the parties.
*

.

. Compensation
75 was to be measured entirely by com-

missions earned.
Thus, the court held the defendant personally liable for the advances in order to prevent a rewriting of the contract.7 6 The effect
of such a rule is to create a debt running from servant to master.
The Alabama cases have been even more explicit in their designation of such transactions as loans. In Liberty National Life Insurance Co. v. Longshore,77 the Supreme Court of Alabama directly
refuted the majority view and held that such advances were loans.
Referring to an earlier Alabama case, Beck v. West, 78 the court construed such advances "not [as] payments to Beck, but loans or advances to be made to him

. . .

and, if such share of the profits fell

short of reimbursing [the plaintiffs] then Beck would owe them
79
the balance.
If the minority cases as represented by Alabama and Pennsylvania have anything in common beside their holdings, it is that they
are devoid of any rationale for the construction given the contracts
in those cases. A careful reading of the minority cases ruling upon
the question presented produces no exposition of any legal or policy
basis for their conclusions other than a surface investigation of the
contracts and an unexplained desire to refrain from implying terms
into them.80
Furthermore, an examination of the legal principles that would
necessarily be involved in the minority determination-that advances by a principal to an agent are loans--exposed serious difficulties to such a construction. A loan is the delivery by one party,
and the receipt by another party, of a sum of money upon an agree75. 282 Pa. at 67-68, 127 A.at 310.
76. Compare Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Carey, 282 Pa. 598, 128 A. 537
(1925) with Producer's Lumber Co. v. Guiniven, 260 Pa. 536, 103 A. 916
(1918).
77. 222 Ala. 408, 132 So. 614 (1931).
78. 81 Ala. 213, 6 So. 70 (1889).
79. 222 Ala.at 409, 132 So. at 615.
80. See cases cited innote 70 supra. The possibility of one exception
exists in the Texas case of Martinez v. Cathey, 215 S.W. 370 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1919). In that case, the plaintiff employed the defendants to sell
cigars on a commission basis. Advances of $425.00 per month were paid.
In a subsequent suit brought by the employer, the court considered the
advances as loans but reasoned that whether they were loans depended
on the use to which the funds were put, thus establishing a basis for the
rule.
However, the Texas cases are not included in the minority discussion
since that state has apparently adopted the majority rule in the interim.
See Denton v. Berset, 212 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).

ment, express or implied, to repay the sum with or without interest."' Many jurisdictions hold that if the obligation to repay is
based upon a contingency or condition which may or may not happen, the transaction is not a loan. 2 However, the most important
rule regarding the legal concept of loans is the general recognition
that the burden of proving a loan, and its nonpayment, lies with he
who claims to be its creditor.8 3 Also, it has been held that although
the word advance may refer to a loan, it may equally well connote
gifts or advancements and does not necessarily imply a promise to
repay.84

The minority position, when examined in light of the requirements for a loan, appears quite questionable. If advances made
contingent cannot be considered loans, the minority rule fails to consider that the contracts in question invariably provide that repayment of the advances is to be made by deducting them from future
(contingent) commissions earned. But the most important legal
principle regarding loans is that, in cases for their recovery, the
plaintiff would have to sustain the burden of proof.8 5 Whereas the
minority rule conceptualizing such transactions as loans has the
practical effect of placing the burden of proof to the contrary upon
the agent or servant, it violates the rule of evidence accepted by
81. Northern Mining Corp. v. Trunz, 124 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1941); Nat'l
Bank v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 131 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Ohio 1954); Batchelor v. Mandigo, 95 Cal. App. 2d 816, 213 P.2d 762 (1950); Rogers v. HannonHatch Post No. 9929 V.F.W., 23 Conn. Supp. 326, 182 A.2d 923 (Sup. Ct
Conn 1964); Isaacson v. House, 216 Ga. 698, 119 S.E.2d 113 (1961); Engelking
v. Investment Bd., 93 Idaho 217, 458 P.2d 213 (1969); Maseberg v. Mercer,
176 Neb. 668, 127 N.W.2d 208 (1964).
82. See McNeil Constr. Co. v. Livingston State Bank, 300 F.2d 88
(9th Cir. 1962); Northern Mining Corp. v. Trunz, 124 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1941
Holbrook v. United States, 194 F. Supp. 252 (D. Ore. 1961); Rae v. Cameron, 112 Mont. 159, 114 P.2d 1060 (1941). Note, however, that there is also
precedent to the effect that loans exist despite such contingencies. See
United Gas Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 240 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1956);
Island Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 57 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1932); American Bemberg Corp. v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 355 (D. Del. 1957).
83. Prince v. Barger, 227 Md. 351, 176 A.2d 870 (1962); Midland Oil &
Royalty Co. v. Schuler, 126 N.W.2d 149 (Sup. Ct. N.D. 1964); Special note
should be taken of the Pennsylvania rule which also places the burden of
proof upon the creditor. See Lee v. Potter, 214 Pa. Super. 198, 251 A.2d 697
(1969).
84. See Grone v. Economic Life Ins. Co., 38 Del. Ch. 158, 80 A. 809
(1911); Linderman v. Carmin, 255 Mo. 62, 164 S.W. 614 (1914); Schlesinger
v. Burland, 42 Misc. 209, 85 N.Y. 350 (Sup. Ct. 1903); Longoria v. State, 126
Tex. Crim. 362, 71 S.W.2d 268 (1934). Contra, B.J. Carney & Co. v. Murphy, 68 Idaho 376, 195 P.2d 339 (1948). Again, it is important to note the
Pennsylvania rule as stated in Mosser Co. v. Cherry River B. and L. Co.,
290 Pa. 67, 138 A. 85 (1927):
While the word advance in its strictly etymological significance
indicates money paid before ...

it has been so frequently used as

its equivalent that it may be said that the word, whether taken
according to its meaning in law or according to its meaning in
common usage, includes loans.
Id. at 70-71, 138 A. at 87 (emphasis added).
85. See cases cited note 83 supra and accompanying text.
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even the minority courts-that the burden of proof for loans lies
86
with the plaintiff.
The contradictions of the minority rule are best explained by
an examination and comparison of their method of analysis. The
majority courts base their conclusions upon an examination of the
contract to discover the relationship of the parties. Once discovered,
the relationship of the parties forms the basis for the sound policy
arguments used in reaching their conclusion. The minority courts,
on the other hand, finding no express or implied agreement for repayment, attempt to assume nothing. In an effort to prevent a destruction of contractual intent, these courts sustain the plaintiffprincipal's allegations of debt. The weakness of this approach is
that in assuming nothing, these courts assume too much-that the
intent existed to create a debt, despite the burden of proof relating
to debts, and that the relationship of the parties must then be that
of a creditor to a debtor.
Perhaps the most surprising fact that an examination of the minority cases reveals is the failure of both principal-plaintiffs and the
courts to discuss the arguable policy bases offered in equity. No
case discussed the possibility of unjust enrichment of the agents involved. The cases in point involve factual situations very susceptible to a claim in quantum meruit. The failure of principals to
seek reimbursement in equity might be explained by a hesitancy to
confront the questions of forfeiture and superior bargaining power
already discussed. Yet the courts of Alabama and Pennsylvania
have failed to include any discussion of these equitable principles in
their decisions. Though the silence of these courts may be due to a
reluctance to approach questions not pleaded, this approach contrasts sharply with that of the majority courts which often base
their holdings on the principal's superior bargaining power or the
possibility of forfeiture. The question of the unjust enrichment of
agents should be approached, whether by counsel or court, in order
for the most reasoned rule to prevail.
In lieu of equitable bases upon which to rest the principal's
claim, the minority rule suffers from defects in its formulation. An
interpretation which gives a reasonable and effective meaning to all
manifestations of intention is preferred to one which leaves a part of
such manifestation unreasonable or ineffective.8 7 Such manifes86. See cases cited note 83 supra and accompanying text.
87. Badger v. Nu-Tone Products Co., 162 Colo. 216, 425 P.2d 698 (1951);
Sumitomo v. Hawaii Nosan, 25 Haw. 691 (Sup. Ct. 1920); RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 236(a)-(d) (1932).

tations must be found by looking beyond the contractual terminology to all of the surrounding circumstances of the transaction.88
It is upon this ground that the minority rule fails. Where the employment contract rationale gives effective meaning to all terms
of the contract and the acts of the parties, the minority rationale
neither takes cognizance of the practical relationship which must
have existed nor gives full effect to the ambiguous contract with
which it is presented.
CONCLUSION

The present rules governing the personal liability of agents or
servants for advances received in excess of commissions earned are
weakened by inconsistencies and contradictions on both sides of
the conflict. The joint venture rationale of the majority is inconsistent with the elements of the joint venture relationship.
Whether from inaccurate interpretation of precedent or a groping
attempt to find acceptable bases for policy judgments, the joint venture rationale is invalid.
In minority jurisdictions, a rule questionable in reason and justice has grown from a desire, perhaps overzealous, to achieve the
very end it deceives-an effective interpretation of contractual intent. Moreover, equitable principles susceptible to use by principals seeking reimbursement have been overlooked. Conversely, the
master-servant rationale of the majority rule is based upon sound
interpretation of precedent and has exhibited uniformity of development. It rectifies the contractual ambiguities left by the parties. It arrives at the same rule as those courts focusing upon the
questionable joint venture rationale without the contradictions of
the latter approach. Both logic and justice substantiate the masterservant formula.
The policy rationales of the majority are also basically sound.
These rationales reflect long recognized policies of the courts. However, the policy arguments of forfeiture and superior bargaining
power must not be utilized when contrary to the evidence presented
in any particular case. The question of unjust enrichment of agents
should also be considered in balancing the equities.
It is submitted that the master-servant and policy rationales
be uniformly adopted by the courts, unless a consideration of
unjust enrichment requires a contrary result. The minority rule
and joint venture rationale of the majority rule should be eliminated. The adoption of the master-servant rationale, and its ancillary policy arguments, would allow employees to undertake endeavors on a commission basis without fear of forfeiture. It would
also establish a uniform guideline by which the business world could
conduct its affairs. Since principals have the primary power to
88.

See cases cited note 84 supra.
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draw their employment contracts, it would not be oppressive to require them to include an explicit contractual provision providing
for personal liability of the agent in cases where advances exceed
earnings. However, in the absence of an express provision, the employee should not bear the burden of proving contractual intent.
It is therefore submitted that an interpretation of contracts involving principal's suits for the recovery of advances in excess of commissions, bonus, or profits earned leads quite logically to the employment formula which raises a presumption against liability.
MARTIN J. KING

